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Rivalries are a key aspect of sports, but one with few counterparts elsewhere in economic
theory.  In this paper rivalries are modeled as a habitual good, and complementary in fan utility
with other trade between residents of team locations.  Some implications for optimal team
investment in rivalry capital, for league investment in competitive balance, and for the
fundamental differences between rivalries in team and individual sports are derived.
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at the meetings of the Western Economic Association in Seattle, Washington from June 29 to
July 3, 2007.“Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure.” 
-  Lord Byron, Don Juan, Ch. 15 
“To enjoy the things we ought and hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on 
excellence of character.” 
-  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1 
 
Rivalries are the most compelling of recurring athletic competitions.   Their 
drama provokes some of the most distinguished commentary on sports, and some of the 
most memorable moments of sports contests.  They have been little-analyzed from the 
perspective of economic theory, although they have occasionally entered empirical 
analysis in an ad hoc way (Owen and Weatherston, 2004; Paul, 2003; Price and Sen, 
2003).  (One partial exception with respect to theory is Amegashie and Kutosoati (2005), 
who, in a study of boxing rematches that they argue also applies more permanent rivalries 
in other sports, take rivalries as given but explore ways to motivate greater effort.)  But it 
seems likely that sports consumers treat rivalry and non-rivalry contests differently, even 
though the outcomes in each contest type are produced by the same firm.  Rivalries can 
thus be viewed as a problem in joint production. 
Rivalries are also different from a preference-modeling perspective from non-
rivalry contests in their intertemporal nature.  Rivalry results are closely monitored and 
often called up years after the fact to enhance (or detract from) fan utility.  This suggests 
that rivalries are a form of the habitual good pioneered in various work by Gary S. 
Becker and others (Becker, 1996; Becker and Murphy, 1988).  This paper merges the 
joint-product and habitual-good approaches to turn the analysis of rivalries into a 
  1standard price-theory problem.  In doing so it generates several empirical implications 
about the circumstances under which rivalries will be more or less important to 
consumers and producers, and indeed what it means economically for a rivalry to be 
“important,” beyond the obvious empirical implication that rivalry contests should 
generate higher demand, ceteris paribus.  Two models are developed, one in which the 
identity of the rivalry contest is exogenous, the other in which a degree of rivalry 
develops endogenously from other exogenous factors.  Sections 1 and present the two 
models, and Sections 3-6 derive some empirical implications, some of which can be 
productively combined with other strands in the theoretical literature on athletic 
competition. 
 
1.  Model 1 – Rivalry and non-rivalry contests as distinct goods 
 
  I first propose that rivalry games and non-rivalry games are simply separate goods, 
jointly produced by the same single firm.  In particular, assume that each fan possesses 
preferences defined by a strictly concave, time-separable utility function over three goods, 
xt, yt and zt.  y is investment by the team in the rivalry game. “Investment” can be 
anything that will raise demand – an improvement in team success or any other increase 
in the appeal of the rivalry to consumers through, for example, persuading them of its 
value.  X is similar investment in the composite non-rivalry schedule, and z is a 
composite market good.  T is a time subscript. 
    The key assumptions are those regarding the relation between demands for the 
various goods.  In particular, let y be a habitual good in the sense of, for example, Becker 
  2and Murphy (1988).  Its value to a consumer depends on his consumption in the past.  It 
is reasonable to suppose that a rivalry that has been one-sided for an extended period of 
time is less attractive for consumers in period t than a rivalry that has been more 
competitive.  Define firm demand faced for yt as 
 
( ) t t t yt t z y x p y , , , − δ .           (1) 
 
  pyt and pxt are prices charged by the firm.  y-t is consumption of y in periods prior 
to t.  Following Becker (1996), let the effect of past consumption on current demand be 
given by , where 0 < * < 1.  Note that this will also be the equivalent of the 










t produced in t.  Thus, rivalry demand depends not 
just on the price set for rivalry investment in the current period but on the price set for 
non-rivalry investment and on past rivalry success, but less so in the latter case as the 
period of comparison recedes farther into the past.  In addition, it depends in ways later to 
be specified on zt, output of the non-market good in the current period, although the 
quantity of this good available is beyond the firm’s control. 
 Demand  for  xt is given by 
  
( t t xt t z y p x , , ) .            (2) 
 
  Thus, consumer demand for rivalry and non-rivalry success will depend on the 
other good’s price (and hence output).  But what distinguished rivalry from non-rivalry 
  3success is the time interdependence of the former.  The value of rivalry success to 
consumers, and hence demand for it, is inextricably bound up with past output of rivalry 
success.  Indeed, this interdependence – preferences defined around the time path of 
rivalry success – is arguably the very definition of a rivalry.  Non-rivalry success, on the 
other hand, can influence rivalry success within the same period, but has no impact on 
demand for either rivalry or non-rivalry success in periods other than t.  
The firm is a price-searcher, and must solve, via optimization over yt and xt, the 
problem 
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  C(xt, yt) is the cost function for production of x and y in period t, and is assumed 
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  It is further assumed that xt and yt are substitutes, so that  
 













.           (5) 
 
zt also enters into the demand for yt.  The sign effect of changes in zt on the 
demand for yt depends on whether they are substitutes or complements.  I will assume, 
for consistency’s sake with respect to Model 2 below, that they are complements.  This 
assumption also seems the more reasonable one.  Evidence of its importance can be 
derived from the international-relations literature, where Beck (2003) finds, essentially, 
that geopolitical rivalry (an example of a non-sports but complementary good) over time 
acts in a complementary way with soccer competition in the rivalry between the national 
teams of Germany and the U.K.  In particular, as the intensity of that geopolitical rivalry 
rises and falls so too does the intensity of fan interest in World Cup matches between the 
teams.  Such matches also interact with behavior of and attitudes by British nationals 
toward Germany and Germans more generally.  This effect is also obvious in within-city 
rivalries, where people trade with one another even as they split allegiances among the 
Chicago Cubs and White Sox, the New York Yankees and Mets, or the athletic teams of 
the University of Southern California and UCLA. 
What drives rivalry demand is thus in part the nature of the intertemporal 
dependence of consumption of it in one period on demand in another.  Just as with any 
other habit, when there are significant spillovers between periods (i.e., * is higher), the 
demand for the full intertemporal stream of rivalry goods is higher and a rational firm 
should invest more in it.    
 
2.  Model 2 – Degrees of rivalry 
  5 
  It is also possible to think about rivalry as differing among all teams within a 
league, and as continuous rather than binary, an approach with implications for optimal 
league structure.  Suppose that preferences are now defined around Y and Z where Y is 
sports competition and Z is as before a composite non-sports good.  In this instance the 
unit of analysis is not an individual team but cities, which trade with one another.  Define 
Yij and Zij as the stock of sports competition (produced by a league) and composite-good 
trade (taken as exogenous by a league) between cities i and j, where i, j = 1,…,n.  
Following the iceberg model of Krugman (1991) and Samuelson (1952), let the demand 
function for Yij, the demand by all residents in city i for sports competition against the 
team from city j, be given by 
  
( ) [ ] ij ij ij t ijt ijt t Z A Y P Y − − 1 , ,δ .          (7) 
 
  Pijt is the price for a unit of investment in quality for competition between cities i 
and j in period t.  Zij is a base measure of (exogenous, to a team or a league) composite-
good trade between cities i and j (assumed constant across periods). tij is a rate of 
depreciation of base output, and is an increasing function of distance between the two 
cities.  Aij is the combined buying power (e.g., income times population) in cities i and j.  
Demand is increasing in Aij and decreasing in tij.  Cities farther apart, in other words, 
trade less in the composite good, while cities with more joint population and income 
trade more.  Links between cities – the degree of complementarity between Yijt and the 
cities’ trade in the composite good Zijt, itself a negative function of distance and a positive 
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consumption and  Zijt in isolation – drive investment in contests against each opponent. 
  The theory is a complement to older theories of league structure, which ordinarily 
rely on entry restriction and optimal spacing of retail outlets – i.e., franchises – in the 
manner of the traditional Hotelling class of retail-location models.  Here, the analysis 
takes team location as exogenous, and rivalry becomes a degree of investment 
corresponding to the factors that drive gravity models of international trade.  The amount 
of potential rivalry will be greater the greater are the forces of economic gravity (in the 
sense of distance and buying power, e.g. gross jurisdictional product) between cities and 
the greater the degree of complementarity in fan preferences between Y and Z.  Such an 
approach is supported by the work of Leonard (2003), who demonstrates that the distance 
component of gravity helps determine college-football attendance.  Rivalry investment in 
a particular periodic contest between teams of an i-j pair will vary with these gravity 
factors in the model here.   
  This gravity effect can explain the idea of the one-sided rivalry.  Many leagues 
have teams with vastly disproportionate (before accounting for wealth or population) 
numbers of fans who both love and hate the teams – the New York Yankees in MLB, the 
Yomiuri Giants (located in Tokyo) in Japanese professional baseball, the Los Angeles 
Lakers in the NBA.  Often these teams engage in competitions with teams from smaller 
markets for whom these games are extremely important events, while for the larger-
market teams they are non-rivalry games.  If the relative proportion of complementary 
composite-consumption ties is (as seems likely) much higher for the smaller-market 
teams, their fans, fueled by investment by teams, might emphasize these games much 
  7more than fans and teams in the large markets.  This effect is particularly pronounced in 
Japanese baseball.  In that country Tokyo dominates the culture and politics to a much 
greater extent than any city does in the U.S.  (Tokyo has two teams, but one, the Yomiuri 
Giants, has a much more successful history.)  Such a large gravity deficit between two 
markets suggests that the rivalry is far more lucrative to the small than the large market; 
since the large market is likely to have many such one-way rivalries, it cannot 
simultaneously invest a great amount in all of them.  No accommodation can or should be 
made to any particular one-sided rivalry in scheduling, but such rivalries will flow in one 
direction – from the smaller to the larger market – anyway. 
  A similar effect is suggested by rivalries between teams with much and little at 
stake in competitive terms.  Many college football rivalries are very one-sided, matching 
long-time powerhouses against teams with little recent general success.  So too in 
professional sports, late in the season one rival may have a postseason berth at stake 
while the other may already be eliminated from contention.  The theory suggests that the 
opportunity cost of rivalry investment for the team with more at stake in non-rivalry 
contests is higher (given that every remaining game counts the same in the playoff chase), 
hence the weaker team may invest a great deal more in the rivalry, increasing its chances 
of success.  Sports lore has it that in rivalry contests “anything can happen,” and the 
approach here suggests that rivalry underdogs should win more often than their relative 
team strength and the possession of home-field advantage suggests, although little 
empirical evidence exists. 
  Critically, in both this and the prior model the very idea of rivalry is exogenously 
constrained.  Whether seen as directly given (Model 1) or limited by the absence of other 
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problems against contests involving greater rivalry potential.  While certain contests may 
temporarily, over a period of several seasons, yield intense consumer interest because of 
current competitive conditions, the difference between an anticipated game and a rivalry 
is that the latter requires at least an inherent habitual effect and perhaps other economic 
linkages between teams’ jurisdictions.  Rivalries, in other words, cannot be created out of 
thin air, and competitions with high fan interest purely generated by current competitive 
conditions (a series of seasons in which two teams compete for a divisional or league title, 
for example), do not have this quality.
1  
 
3.  Investment in rivalries 
  This habitual-goods approach, in either model, also provides motivation for the 
notion of investment in rivalries by athletic firms.  College football rivalries in particular 
are notable for the extra investments made by team pairs to make the rivalry more 
attractive to fans.  Some games have paraphernalia that go to the winners.  The winner of 
the annual football game between the University of California and Stanford University, 
for example, obtains a commemorative item known as The Axe because it contains an 
axe head mounted on a trophy.  The axe head was itself once mounted to an actual ax, 
and used by Stanford yell leaders to decapitate a straw man during the annual football 
game in 1899.  According to legend, in a baseball game soon after, California students 
                                                 
1.  One thinks of the rivalry between the Boston Celtics and the Philadelphia 76ers in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, as fierce as any for a few years but largely forgotten now, in 
contrast to the timeless rivalry between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees. 
  9grabbed the ax away from Stanford fans.  Over the years, it changed hands several times 
before the teams agreed to permanently declare it the temporary property of whichever 
team won the game most recently.  The trophy, and the emotional lore surrounding it
2, is 
a classic example of investment in a habitual good, and indeed bears some resemblance 
to the account of college or university investment in current sports-team quality to 
promote the consumption value of past university attendance proposed by Goff and 
Tollison (1990). 
  Firms sometimes even make these investments to improve the “rivalry capital” 
not of fans but of athletes.  We might expect that for professional and some major-college 
programs the players themselves would have no particular initial propensity to value a 
traditional rivalry, coming as they do from all over the country.  (An exception would be 
a college athletic rivalry where most players come from within the state and have long 
exposure to the rivalry and its intensity.)  There is no particular reason for draftees of the 
Celtics or the Lakers to enter the NBA hating the Lakers or the Celtics.  But such hatred, 
and greater effort in rivalry contests, can be cultivated.  Bradley (2006) reports the 
example of Notre Dame and the University of Southern California, teams united merely 
by competitive history rather than any close economic ties.  In the early years of the 
rivalry, just after the death of Knute Rockne, USC coach Howard Jones took the team to 
visit Rockne’s grave after a major victory at Notre Dame, obviously not to motivate the 
team for that game but presumably as an investment in the future intensity of the rivalry.  
                                                 
2.  Including the habit of Stanford changing the score of the 1982 game, which ended on 
a famously controversial kickoff return, when it possesses the trophy and California 
changing it back when it recovers it. 
  10More concretely, Russell (1983) finds that hockey players (most of them presumably 
from elsewhere than their team’s city) behave more aggressively, measured by aggression 
penalties received, in intradivisional rivalry games.   
Another form of investment in rivalries is branding.   College rivalries often 
possess informal names (“The Civil War,” etc.).  Increasingly even broadcast networks, 
who have an obvious interest in increasing rivalry attractiveness, officially invoke such 
terminology, such as the christening in television broadcasts and elsewhere of the 
University of Texas-Oklahoma University football game by its long-time unofficial name, 
“The Red River Shootout.”  Such investments presumably serve to separate such rivalries 
not just from the other games for those teams but from other rivalries involving other 
teams, promoting a particular rivalry’s sense of uniqueness and thus increasing its 
desirability to fans.  
  Such tactics – the employment of paraphernalia, the investment in player 
appreciation for the rivalry that is of a piece with other sorts of human-capital 
investments, the adoption of a brand name – make little sense in periodic contests not 
likely to yield big future payoffs from such investments.  Indeed, given the way in which 
they increase utility across time in ways not possible for contests with little if any cross-
good complementarities or intertemporal persistence, the rough equivalent in a non-
rivalry contest to these investments is perhaps to a simple cash discount or other direct 
compensation.  American sports teams frequently employ promotional tactics involving 
giveaways of merchandise, and these tactics are generally employed in contests against 
non-rivalry opponents. 
  11This model also implies that there can be an optimal division of a sports league 
into groups that will compete against one another more often in a particular season, with 
economic closeness (taking into account not just actual geographic distance, but income 
and population as well) driving the formation of divisions.  Indeed the formation of such 
units in professional leagues, along with conferences in college athletics, is a way to 
subsidize the formation of rivalries.  There are of course other theories of divisions, 
including the control of moral hazard and the enabling of postseason competition (Krakel, 
2006) and the ability to increase uncertainty and hence demand by increasing the number 
of steps needed to win a championship (Noll, 2003).  The motivation here is not mutually 
exclusive with these motivations, but an additional consideration.  The greater the 
division of leagues into regions that are compact internally but far apart from one another, 
the greater the ability to use a divisional structure and unbalanced scheduling to promote 
rivalry.  
  Table 1 depicts combined populations and geographic distances for each pair of 
cities in each division of the National Football League.  Ignoring income differences 
across cities, this is a crude measure of Aij(1 – tij).  The two divisions with the least 
combined distance, the NFC North and the AFC Central, are those where traditional 
divisional rivalries are often thought to have the greatest force.  (When the NFL 
reorganized into eight four-team divisions substantial effort was made to retain these 
rivalries, at the expense of the expelled teams, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and the 
Tennessee Titans.)  There are also few if any opportunities to switch any pair of teams 
among divisions in a way that decreases both intradivisional distances.  This is 
presumably partly because of transportation-cost considerations for road teams, but 
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to the league – e.g., the location of the Jacksonville Jaguars in the NFC West.  This 
suggests that distance considerations loomed large in the 2002 reorganization. 
  Thus, in this argument rivalry can be thought of as (endogenously) emanating 
from two forces.  We may speak of rivalry driven by intertemporal complementarity, the 
habitual-consumption motivation constructed earlier, as well as rivalry driven by cross-
product complementarity with non-sports output, that deriving from other economic ties 
between team locations.  Neither is obviously the single dominant contributor.  Notre 
Dame and USC have one of college football’s most compelling rivalries (in which many 
not connected with either school take an active rooting interest) despite an almost 
complete absence of economic ties between South Bend, Indiana and Los Angeles.  And 
it is sometimes argued that Cleveland and Pittsburgh have a more natural baseball rivalry 
than Cleveland and Cincinnati despite their near-equidistance, based on their other ties 
(including a compelling rivalry between their NFL teams).  But equilibrium rivalry 
investment can and frequently is driven by both. 
 
4.  Scheduling 
 
  In addition to firm location, another variable over which a league has control is 
scheduling, in particular the amount of scheduling devoted to rivalry games.  Concavity 
of preferences in either specification indicates that there will be diminishing returns to 
scheduling more rivalry games.  While not explicitly modeled, the tradeoffs that might 
enter into fan preferences to be balances against rivalry scheduling include diversity of 
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equal) and competitive balance.  (Competitive balance in a rivalry environment is 
discussed further below.) 
  Table 2 depicts the number and percentage of games against each divisional 
opponent, where rivalry games are traditionally most likely to be found and in any event, 
in Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National Basketball 
Association, the National Hockey League and Major League Soccer.  In MLB, extra, 
specially scheduled interleague rivalry games are also included.  The immediate thing to 
notice is the relatively small proportion of rivalry games in the NBA at the level of either 
an individual opponent or the total number of potential rivalry games, combined with the 
unusually large proportion in MLB.  (MLS has a large percentage, but that is because 
they have only 13 teams spread across the country and two conferences rather than 
divisions.  Whether much intraconference competition is potentially rivalrous is very 
debatable here, although MLS does schedule extra games for closer geographic 
neighbors.)  The reasons for the smaller proportion of games against divisional opponents 
in basketball is not clear, although it is possible that the star effects in this sport, because 
of smaller numbers of players on the court at a time, is greater and hence so is demand 
for opponent variety.  (Hockey has only six players on the ice at a time on each team, but 
in short shifts.  Any one player’s share of total minutes played will thus still be small.)  In 
the other sports, where there are many more players so that the marginal product and 
therefore marginal utility, other things equal, of each is (arguably) lower, the utility of a 
particular team as an opponent, as opposed to the desire to watch a particular player on 
that team, may thus be greater.  Attempts to capitalize on rivalry utility are clearly 
  14identifiable in the extra game (in one conference) devoted to specific potential geographic 
rivals in MLS and the aforementioned interleague rival preference in MLB and the very 
large intradivisional scheduling in the NHL.  Neither the NBA, NHL or NFL shows this 
preference for added rivalry games outside the divisional structure, although the NFL 
does in preseason, where many teams have annual games (often in the final week) against 
natural geographic rivals.  (Preseason of course is a considerably weaker effect than a 
regular-season opponent.) 
  So too some college conferences clearly invest more in rivalry opponents.  The 
Atlantic Coast Conference now consists of twelve teams, having added three in recent 
years.  In football, the conference explicitly has each team play an annual game against 
one opponent in the other division every year, in addition to its annual intradivisional 
games.  Some of these games have little historical content (Virginia Tech vs. the most 
recent addition to the conference, Boston College, for example), but most clearly show 
high levels of historical or geographic consumption capital – Miami vs. Florida State and 
Duke vs. Wake Forest, e.g.  
  Investment in rivalries through scheduling is conspicuously missing in some 
national soccer leagues outside the U.S., where all opponents are frequently scheduled 
the same number of times.  The lack of playoffs in these leagues mean there is little 
reason to have a divisional structure, and so there is no occasion to differentiate with 
respect to scheduling frequency on divisional grounds among opponents.  There is, in 
other words, no investment by the league in rivalry promotion through the schedule.  In 
the English Premier League, for example, each team is an opponent two out of 38 games, 
constituting 5.3 percent of all games.  There is no apparent reason other than scheduling 
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effort to scheduling so as to promote rivalry.  The use of relegation in non-U.S. leagues is 
a complicating factor because it raises the possibility of fan dissatisfaction through 
unequal scheduling affecting relegation outcomes.  A team that must play rivalry games 
against an opponent at the top of the standings is handicapped by an unbalanced schedule, 
and a team playing its rivalry games against an opponent at the bottom is aided by this 
approach.  Major-league baseball carries out such unbalanced scheduling, particularly 
against interleague rivals, without much permanent complaint (although fans of particular 
teams who miss the playoffs in a particular year sometimes complain of such lack of 
balance being responsible for rank-order finishes in the standings).   
Unless the consequences of relegation are significantly worse than those for 
missing the playoffs in a league that has them (and perhaps despite this), it appears that 
soccer leagues outside the U.S. miss a significant opportunity to enhance revenue through 
greater use of unbalanced schedules.  Indeed, the lack of a playoff structure deprives 
teams of a chance to play to either make or advance in the playoffs.  Presumably such 
contests significantly increase rivalry capital, at least temporarily.  (If the teams did not 
continue to meet in high-stakes contests rivalry capital might depreciate more rapidly.)  
While the presence of contests over relegation offset this to some extent, if soccer leagues 
are characterized by several large-market or historically dominant teams who have 
dominated competition and who have large numbers of fans and anti-fans outside their 
home market, the absence of a postseason structure, which involves contests for 
championships at the top rather than relegation at the bottom, may inhibit the 
development of rivalries and hence lower profits, other things equal. 
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5.  Turnover, competitive balance and rivalry 
 
  It is well-known that, particularly in the U.S., sports leagues take steps to increase 
competitive balance below what free competition among teams for player services might 
yield.  The usual explanations for this are that it enhances both demand for franchises 
otherwise not well-positioned to contend for championships and that champion diversity 
is (perhaps offset by love of dynasties) appealing in its own right.  The list of measures 
taken to improve competitive balance is long and differs, because of the legal constraints 
on nonprofit groups and historical/institutional reasons, between collegiate and 
professional sports.  Some of these measures will trade off against the courting of rivalry 
intensity. 
  A habitual-goods approach suggests that some measures to improve competitive 
balance will increase the rate of turnover on team rosters.  This will have the effect of 
lowering the intertemporal dependency of rivalry consumption, *, and hence the amount 
of investment teams make in rivalry production or quality.  A salary cap that lowers the 
average duration of players with teams will mean that next year’s team bears less relation 
to this year’s, making last year’s rivalry game less complementary with this year’s.  If a 
star player (either because of his success or failure) is a key factor in a particular team 
winning this year, his absence next year makes next year’s game less appealing, other 
things equal.  Free agency is (assuming the Coase theorem does not hold) one way in 
which rivalry intensity is diminished, but in all likelihood salary caps are even more so.  
Any salary cap that increases roster turnover will have a similar effect on rivalry-based 
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own investments in rivalry appreciation, analogous to the music appreciation investments 
(which enhance desire for classical-music consumption) of Stigler and Becker (1977).  In 
the NFL, with its unique combination of a salary cap, less guaranteed compensation and 
frequent substantial injuries that motivate teams to release players, this rivalry-retarding 
effect may be particularly high.  Of course, this is an argument that can be applied to 
anything that restricts player movement.  The Bosman decision by the European Court of 
Justice and the advent of free agency in most North American sports have also lowered *, 
lowering the appeal of rivalries, as would league expansion.  In no sense does this effect 
make these events economically unwise, but it is an unaccounted-for cost.  
  Not all measures to enhance competitive balance are subject to this effect.  
Responses that do not significantly increase the rate of roster turnover will have no 
rivalry cost.  The reverse-order draft has only the most marginal effects – all teams are 
granted the same number of draft picks, although a weaker team may have a draft set in a 
given year with more members likely to make the team.  Reverse-order scheduling, of the 
sort once extensively employed by the NFL, would have no effect on rivalry value 
(assuming rivalries are games scheduled in fixed amounts annually).  Income-
redistribution schemes such as luxury taxes and salary caps would redistribute rivalry 
opportunities from richer franchises to poorer ones, allowing the latter to invest more in 
rivalry cultivation but requiring the former to invest less.   
 
6.  Individual vs. team rivalries 
 
  18  Rivalries between individual athletes, either in individual sports such as tennis or 
golf, or between particular athletes in team sports, such as Wilt Chamberlain and Bill 
Russell, can also be examined using the approach here.  In each case, the models suggest 
that the incentive for individual athletes to make investments specifically in rivalry 
capital for the sake of greater public interest are less than the corresponding incentives for 
team owners in team rivalries.  Individuals are not systematically connected through 
potentially complementary trade in the same way as team-hosting jurisdictions are, 
although there may still be a habitual component in consumption.  The absence of such 
complementary effects between Y and Z means that the marginal returns to rivalry-
specific investments are lower.  While fans may derive some utility from specific contests 
between, say, Chris Evert and Martina Navratilova or Phil Mickelson and Tiger Woods, 
the incentives for the athletes themselves to embellish the rivalry or to invest in tactics 
specifically to counter the other opponent are somewhat smaller.  In a team sport, much 
of the increased benefit of investments by an individual player in a particular rivalry will 
leak out to other players (on both teams), suggesting a possible under-investment 
problem. 
  Consequently, such rivalries should generally be less compelling for fans than 
team-based rivalries.  The examples offered above indicate that they are not unknown, 
but are perhaps less memorable than longstanding team rivalries.  The fact that individual 
athletes retire while teams can in principle live forever further accentuates this distinction.  
The Red Sox and the Yankees may still be fierce rivals in twenty years’ time, but any pair 
of athletes who are rivals now will not be playing then.  Often in team sports individual 
rivalries are subsumed into the larger team rivalries.  When such individual rivalries exist, 
  19they tend to be defined by highly particular circumstances.  That they might involve such 
players as star basketball centers, who possess rare physical attributes (Berri, et al., 2004) 
in a sport in which a single player can dominate indicates that they are likely candidates 
for such rivalries.  On the other hand, the relatively limited role of rivalry scheduling in 
the NBA, discussed above, mitigates this tendency. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This approach to rivalry intensity as an outcome of optimal investment decisions 
is the merest first step.  Many other strategic considerations could be introduced.  It is 
possible that both sides of a rivalry might behave in predictable ways if their choices are 
mutually dependent.  The incentives for athletes operating in a rivalry context, or of fans’ 
desire to create rivalries themselves, are also ripe for further exploration.  Perhaps most 
importantly, optimal and actual team and league behavior in the presence of potential 
rivalry profits is a topic that merits more attention. 
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Table 1 
Divisional gravity, National Football League 
   Population  Distance     Population Distance 
NFC East       AFC East 
Dallas-New York  5,221,801  1560    Buffalo-Miami 1,170,111  1400 
Dallas-Philadelphia    1440   Buffalo-NY            370 
Dallas-Washington    1310   Buffalo-NE            470 
NY-Philadelphia 9,314,235  110    Miami-NY  2,253,362   1330 
NY-Washington    240   Miami-NE           1520 
Philadelphia-Wash. 6,188,463  130    NY-NE   9,314,235     210 
Washington   4,923,153     New England 3,406,829 
Total    25,647,652  4790   Total   16,144,537    5300 
 
NFC South       AFC South 
Atlanta-Carolina 4,112,198  240    Houston-Ind.  4,177,646    1000 
Atlanta-New  Orleans    480   Houston-Jack.             890 
Atlanta-Tampa      416   Houston-Tenn.             780 
Carolina-NO   1,499,293  720    Ind.-Jack.  1,607,486      840 
Carolina-Tampa      508   Ind.-Tenn.              280 
New Orleans-Tampa 1,337,726  474    Jack.-Tenn.  1,100,491      560 
Tampa    2,395,997    Tennessee  1,231,331 
Total      9,345,214  2838    Total    8,116,954     4350 
 
NFC North       AFC North 
Chicago-Detroit 9,157,450  280    Baltimore-Cin.7,608,070     424 
Chicago-Green  Bay    186   Balt.-Cleve.              360 
Chicago-Minnesota    410   Balt.-Pitt.             250 
Detroit-Green Bay  4,456,428  287    Cin.-Cleveland 1,646,395    220 
Detroit-Minnesota    690   Cin.-Pittsburgh            257 
Green Bay-Minnesota 226,178  261    Cle.-Pittsburgh 2,250,871    130 
Minnesota   4,919,492    Pittsburgh   2,358,695 
Total    18,759,548  2114   Total   13,864,031      1641 
 
NFC West       AFC West 
Arizona-St. Louis  5,130,632  1480    Denver-KC 2,109,282  610 
Arizona-San  Fran.    760   Denver-Oak.    946 
Arizona-Seattle    1470   Denver-SD    1100 
St. Louis-San Fran.  2,796,368  2120    KC-Oakland 1,766,062  1498 
St. Louis-Seattle    2140   KC-San  Diego    1590 
San Fran.-Seattle 776,733  810    Oakland-SD 2,392,557  446 
Seattle    2,414,616    San Diego 2,813,833 
Total    11,118,349  8780   Total   9,091,734  6190 
Note: Populations are of metro areas, from http://www.city-data.com; city distances are 
from http://www.travelnotes.org/NorthAmerica/distances.htm. 
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Table 2 
 
Intradivisional and specified rivalry games 
 
  Intradivisional   Other rivalry  Total (all rivalry games) 
  (max. per team) 
NFL 
 0.125    0    0.375   
MLB
1  
 0.105-0.117   0.037    0.352-0.562 
NBA 
 0.049    0    0.195 
NHL 
 0.098    0    0.390 
MLS
2 
  East  0.100    0    0.600 
  West  0.133    0    0.533 
 
Notes 
1.  MLB does not apply same scheduling rules to all teams or team pairs. 
2.  MLS has conferences, not divisions.  Scheduling rules are different and number of 
teams are different in the two conferences. 
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